dogestore
[GoogleCTF, 2018]
 Category: crypto
 Points: 267
 Description:
Secret Cloud Storage System: This is a new system to store your endtoend encrypted secrets. Now with SHA3 integrity checks!
nc dogestore.ctfcompetition.com 1337
Writeup
As with the last two years, Google hosted another Capture the Flag competition. This time the challenges were quite hard, but also lots of fun to solve. We, "LosFuzzys", teamed up with the Viennese CTF team "We_0wn_You" and played together under the name "KuK Hofhackerei".
We didn't solve this challenge in time, but our exploit did finish executing a few hours after the CTF closed.
The Challenge
At first we tried looking at the attached files. There were two files:
 a
fragments.rs
Rust source file  an
encrypted_secret
binary file
The objective was to recover the plaintext contents of the encrypted_secret
file.
We can also send an encrypted file to the server and have it decrypt and decode the file. It will then send back the base64encoded SHA3 hash of the decoded data.
Here are the contents of the Rust file:
const FLAG_SIZE: usize = 56;
const FLAG_DATA_SIZE: usize = FLAG_SIZE * 2;
#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
struct Unit {
letter: u8,
size: u8,
}
fn deserialize(data: &Vec<u8>) > Vec<Unit> {
let mut secret = Vec::new();
for (letter, size) in data.iter().tuples() {
secret.push(Unit {
letter: *letter,
size: *size,
});
}
secret
}
fn decode(data: &Vec<Unit>) > Vec<u8> {
let mut res = Vec::new();
for &Unit { letter, size } in data.iter() {
res.extend(vec![letter; size as usize + 1].iter())
}
res
}
fn decrypt(data: &Vec<u8>) > Vec<u8> {
key = get_key();
iv = get_iv();
openssl::symm::decrypt(
openssl::symm::Cipher::aes_256_ctr(),
&key,
Some(&iv),
data
).unwrap()
}
fn store(data: &Vec<u8>) > String {
assert!(
data.len() == FLAG_DATA_SIZE,
"Wrong data size ({} vs {})",
data.len(),
FLAG_DATA_SIZE
);
let decrypted = decrypt(data);
let secret = deserialize(&decrypted);
let expanded = decode(&secret);
base64::encode(&compute_sha3(&expanded)[..])
}
The Code
It seems this code is part of the server. The store(data)
function seems to be the
main entry point where the sent data is processed.
After a bit of experimenting with the service, we found out that the data
variable is the raw input we send to the server.
However, we noticed that the server reads 110 bytes, not the 112 bytes
stated in the FLAG_DATA_SIZE
constant.
Once there, it gets processed in multiple steps:
decrypt(data)
: our data is decrypted with AES256 in CTR mode with an unknown key and noncedeserialize(decrypted)
: an array ofUnit
s is constructed from the decrypted data, representing a byte and a count (how often the byte should be repeated). This is a kind of runlengthencodingdecode(secret)
: the runlengthencoding is decoded, but a count of zero here means one. In fact, every count is increased by onecompute_sha3(expanded)
: the decoded data is hashed with the SHA3 hashing algorithm. The exact algorithm used here doesn't matter much, the important thing to note is that it's a oneway function, and we can only test if the hash changed or not.base64::encode(hash)
: afterwards, the hash digest is base64 encoded and sent back over the wire.
The Vulnerability
Looking at the steps, it doesn't look that bad, but after a little bit of trying around, it seems that the nonce used for decryption is constant and reused every time we send something to the server. This is a glaring vulnerability, as a nonce should only ever be used once.
(*Image by Gwenda (PNG version), WhiteTimberwolf (SVG version) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons*)As you can see, the ciphertext is XORed with an XORpad generated by encrypting the nonce and counter with the key. This XORpad is completely independent from the ciphertext and plaintext, and thus constant.
Also, the ciphertext is merely XORed with that XORpad, so every bitflip we introduce in the ciphertext is exactly replicated in the decrypted plaintext at exactly that offset. Moreover, decrypting only nullbytes yields the XORpad.
This alone is not enough to expose the key, as we only get a hash of the decoded key. However, we can abuse a property of the runlengthencoding to produce hashcollisions.
Here is an example:
letter: 'A'

 count: 6 times 6 times
  decode  SHA3 + base64
0x41 0x05 0x41 0x02 =========> AAAAAAAAA ==> 9 times ================> PRZqCLkb9WfZtPBvGBAbw4knLYl482IOxMiXwUWURqw=
  
 count: 3 times 3 times ^
 
letter: 'A' 
same hash! 
letter: 'A' 
 
 count: 5 times 5 times v
  decode  SHA3 + base64
0x41 0x04 0x41 0x03 =========> AAAAAAAAA ==> 9 times ================> PRZqCLkb9WfZtPBvGBAbw4knLYl482IOxMiXwUWURqw=
  
 count: 4 times 4 times

letter: 'A'
The reason this works is that during decoding, adjacent letter blocks are just concatenated, and if two letter blocks consist only of the same letter, after concatenation, it's impossible to distinguish how many of the letters came from which block.
Also, it doesn't matter what the actual count is: Simply decreasing one count and increasing the other should not change the length of the decoded text, and if the letters are the same, the hash should stay the same as well.
The Attack
Sadly, we cannot reliably decrease or increase bytes in the decrypted data, only flip bits.
If we flip the lowestorder bit, two things can happen:
 the value increases by one if the bit was unset aka the value was even
 the value decreases by one if the bit was set aka the value was odd
This means that if we flip both counts' lowestorder bits the length either doesn't change at all (which is what we want) if the lowestorder bits differ (i.e. one is even and the other is odd) or the length increases or decreases by two if the lowestorder bits are the same (i.e. both are even or both are odd).
From that, we can formulate the following attack to recover the XOR between two
adjacent Unit
s:
Recovering the Letter XOR
guessed letter XOR

sent data: 0x00 0x00 guess 0x00
decrypted: let1 cnt1 decr cnt2 => base1_hash
sent data: 0x00 0x01 guess 0x01
decrypted: let1 cnt1 decr cnt2 => test1_hash
^ ^
flipped lowestorder bit
guessed letter XOR flipped lowestorder bit
 v
sent data: 0x00 0x00 guess 0x01
decrypted: let1 cnt1 decr cnt2 => base2_hash
sent data: 0x00 0x01 guess 0x00
decrypted: let1 cnt1 decr cnt2 => test2_hash
^
flipped lowestorder bit
In this attack, let1
, cnt1
, let2
, and cnt2
represent bytes from the
decryption XORpad, interpreted as a letter or count when sending an (almost)
all zeroes ciphertext.
decr
is the XOR between guess
and let2
.
If we guessed the XOR between let1
and let2
correctly, decr
will be equal
to let1
, and the vulnerable situation described above will occur.
Consequently, if cnt1
and cnt2
differ in their lowestorder bit, then
base1_hash
and test1_hash
will be equal. If they are both even or both odd,
then base2_hash
and test2_hash
will be equal.
If we guessed incorrectly, neither of the pairs will be equal.
This means that in as little as 256*4
(worstcase) attempts, we can recover
the XOR between two adjacent letter bytes. (adjacent in this context means
located in adjacent Unit
s)
For recovering the XOR between count bytes, a few more hashes are necessary:
Recovering the Count XOR
recovered letter XOR

sent data: 0x00 0x00 lxor 0x00
decrypted: let1 cnt1 let1 cnt2 => base1_hash
sent data: 0x00 pow lxor pow
decrypted: let1 cnt1 let1 cnt2 => test_bit_hash
^ ^
flipped nth bit
Here, lxor
is the recovered letter XOR from above and pow
is the nth power
of two.
If cnt1
and cnt2
differ in their nth bit, then test_bit_hash
will be the
same as base1_hash
. We don't have to request base1_hash
since it is the same
as in the last iteration of the above attack for guessing the letter XOR.
Therefore, 7 more attempts are required to recover the XOR between two adjacent count bytes.
Chaining the attack
To attack different parts of the decryption XORpad the attack payload can be prepended and appended with anything (we chose zeroes) to move the payload to overlap the attacked two units.
After attacking each pair, the XOR between two letter and count bytes respectively is known. Knowledge of the preceding and following letter and count XOR values is not needed, so the attack can be trivially distributed and parallelized. The limiting factor is the speed of the attacked server.
These are the recovered letter and count XOR values:
>> letter xors
[
191, 119, 132, 188, 171, 242, 33, 15, 50, 0, 32, 130, 110, 51, 57, 36, 108,
223, 132, 48, 58, 47, 190, 144, 54, 115, 250, 91, 13, 16, 25, 193, 178, 26,
115, 140, 231, 65, 99, 180, 221, 121, 92, 206, 16, 64, 152, 181, 231, 228,
136, 149, 177, 237
]
>> count xors
[
73, 144, 186, 217, 118, 36, 95, 211, 27, 42, 53, 201, 159, 255, 22, 105, 94,
172, 128, 119, 170, 28, 157, 183, 114, 107, 49, 248, 147, 241, 153, 129, 199,
37, 51, 84, 250, 35, 235, 225, 197, 205, 41, 230, 129, 107, 248, 35, 197,
142, 58, 204, 52, 21
]
Offline Decryption
After recovering all letter and count XOR values the only missing pieces are the first letter byte and the first count byte. When these are known, any payload encrypted with the key can be decrypted.
Fortunately, we know that the decrypted secret must contain the text CTF{
,
since a flag must be in there somewhere.
Using this, we first guess the first letter key byte (256 possibilities) and
ignore the runlength count (always take each letter once). For each possible
decryption that contains CTF{
we then guess the first count byte (256
possibilities), looking for decryptions that contain CTF{
even after
runlengthdecoding (as opposed to e.g.{% raw %} CCCCCTTFF{{{{{{{
{% endraw %}).
Finally, we got out the decrypted data:
{% raw %}
b'HFHFHHHDHDHDDDDDDSSSSSSSAAAAaAAAAAACTF{{{SADASDSDCTF{LLLLLLLLL___EEEEE____RRRRRRRRRRR_OYYYYYYYYYY_JEEEEEEENKKKINNSSS}ASDDDDDDDCTF{{{{{\n'
{% endraw %}
and the flag:
CTF{LLLLLLLLL___EEEEE____RRRRRRRRRRR_OYYYYYYYYYY_JEEEEEEENKKKINNSSS}
The correct decryption XORpad was this:
[
174, 22, 17, 95, 102, 207, 226, 117, 94, 172, 245, 218, 7, 254, 38, 161, 41,
114, 27, 105, 27, 67, 59, 118, 185, 191, 215, 32, 228, 223, 221, 201, 249,
160, 149, 254, 74, 82, 206, 210, 254, 165, 196, 15, 235, 19, 85, 142, 197,
57, 243, 75, 128, 32, 122, 17, 33, 233, 44, 122, 60, 139, 37, 18, 228, 147,
86, 84, 76, 113, 63, 66, 179, 22, 84, 236, 21, 207, 118, 36, 194, 197, 31, 0,
102, 205, 58, 228, 244, 2, 228, 131, 164, 232, 60, 16, 137, 51, 110, 246,
138, 120, 2, 66, 151, 142, 38, 186, 203, 175
]
The Script
This is the cleanedup exploit script we used to recover the flag:
from pwn import *
import base64
FLAG_SIZE = 55
FLAG_DATA_SIZE = FLAG_SIZE * 2
bord = lambda code: bytes([code])
class Unit:
"""
Represents a letter with run length encoding count
"""
def __init__(self, letter, size):
self.letter = letter
self.size = size
def __repr__(self):
return "<{}*{}>".format(bytes([self.letter]), self.size + 1)
def crypt(data, key):
"""
Encrypts the data with the specified xorpad key
(xorpad generated by AES_256_CTR)
"""
return bytes(data[i] ^ key[i] for i in range(FLAG_DATA_SIZE))
def deserialize(data):
"""
Construct Unit instances from bytestream
Every second byte is a repeat length
"""
units = []
for i in range(0, len(data), 2):
units.append(Unit(data[i], data[i + 1]))
return units
def decode(units):
"""
Decode run length encoding
(zero length decodes as one)
"""
res = b""
for unit in units:
res += bytes([unit.letter]) * (unit.size + 1)
return res
def decode_without_runlength(units):
"""
Decode without applying run length encoding
Useful for checking flag plausibility
"""
res = b""
for unit in units:
res += bytes([unit.letter])
return res
def decrypt_and_hash(data):
"""
Connect to the remote and decrypt and hash some chosen ciphertext
"""
r = remote("dogestore.ctfcompetition.com", 1337)
r.send(data)
b64 = r.readall()
return base64.b64decode(b64)
with open("encrypted_secret", "rb") as f:
secret = f.read()
letter_xors = [None] * (FLAG_SIZE  1)
count_xors = [None] * (FLAG_SIZE  1)
def xor_payload(offset, l1, c1, l2, c2):
"""
Generate a payload used for finding the XOR difference between neighboring
letters and run length counts
"""
return (
b"\0" * offset +
bord(l1) + bord(c1) + bord(l2) + bord(c2) +
b"\0" * (FLAG_DATA_SIZE  (offset + 4))
)
def find_xor(offset):
"""
Infer the XOR difference between two letters and run length counts in the raw
AES_256_CTR xorpad
(This is where the real magic happens)
Runs in worst case 256*4 + 7 decrypt/hash iterations
"""
letter_xor = None
count_xor = None
for letter_xor_try in range(256):
print(".", end = "")
base_hash = decrypt_and_hash(xor_payload(offset, 0, 0, letter_xor_try, 0))
test_hash = decrypt_and_hash(xor_payload(offset, 0, 1, letter_xor_try, 1))
if base_hash == test_hash:
letter_xor = letter_xor_try
count_xor = 1
break
base2_hash = decrypt_and_hash(xor_payload(offset, 0, 0, letter_xor_try, 1))
test2_hash = decrypt_and_hash(xor_payload(offset, 0, 1, letter_xor_try, 0))
if base2_hash == test2_hash:
letter_xor = letter_xor_try
count_xor = 0
break
if letter_xor == None:
print()
return None, None
for bit in range(1, 8):
print(".", end = "")
power = 1 << bit
test_bit_hash = decrypt_and_hash(xor_payload(offset, 0, power, letter_xor, power))
if test_bit_hash == base_hash:
count_xor = power
print()
return letter_xor, count_xor
def find_all_xor():
"""
Find all XOR differences in the AES_256_CTR xorpad
Narrows down the key space to 256*256 possibilities
"""
for i in range(0, FLAG_SIZE  1):
print(">> {}".format(i))
print(">> letter xors")
print(letter_xors)
print(">> count xors")
print(count_xors)
letter_xor, count_xor = find_xor(2 * i)
letter_xors[i] = letter_xor
count_xors[i] = count_xor
def find_plausible():
"""
Find plausible values for the first xorpad letter and first run length count
and prints potential flags when it finds them
Runs completely offline
"""
key = [0] * FLAG_DATA_SIZE
for start_letter_xor in range(256):
key[0] = start_letter_xor
for i, xor in enumerate(letter_xors):
key[2 * (i + 1)] = key[2 * i] ^ xor
decr = crypt(secret, key)
units = deserialize(decr)
deco_wr = decode_without_runlength(units)
if b"CTF{" in deco_wr:
print(">> plausible letter xor: {:02x}".format(start_letter_xor))
for start_count_xor in range(256):
key[1] = start_count_xor
for i, xor in enumerate(count_xors):
key[2 * (i + 1) + 1] = key[2 * i + 1] ^ xor
decr = crypt(secret, key)
units = deserialize(decr)
deco = decode(units)
if b"CTF{" in deco:
print(">> plausible count xor: {:02x}".format(start_count_xor))
print(">> key")
print(key)
print(deco)
context.log_level = "ERROR"
find_all_xor()
print(">> letter xors")
print(letter_xors)
print(">> count xors")
print(count_xors)
find_plausible()